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A growing literature is exploring the dynamics of government–nonprofit relations,
but most of this work has focused on developed nations with strong economies
and consolidated democracies (Salamon 1995, 2002; Young 1999, 2000). The
nations of the developing world, which by definition have weaker economies,
and generally have less consolidated democracies and smaller nonprofit sectors,
have received less attention (Najam 2000; Coston 1998). Among the latter, the
nations of Latin America present an interesting set of cases: there is wide variation
in terms of levels of economic development and democratic consolidation, but
historically weak nonprofit sectors are a common element. For example, the five
Latin American nations that are represented in the Johns Hopkins University
Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, although they are among the wealthiest
in Latin America, have relatively small sectors compared to other developing
nations, many of whom are less wealthy (Salamon et al. ch. 2).
The final decades of the twentieth century witnessed a period of democratic
stability in Latin America, which unfortunately has – in some nations – fallen
prey to what Weyland (2013) alternately describes as “soft authoritarianism,”
“personalistic plebiscitarianism,” or populism. A growing number of nations,
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including Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and now
Argentina, have fallen under the sway of demagogic leaders who have accrued
executive power, weakened pluralism and undermined effective institutional
checks and balances. At the same time, a number of nations have also moved
toward consolidating democracy with varying degrees of success, with Costa
Rica and Uruguay as clear leaders, but also Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico
making noteworthy progress (Weyland 2013).
In this complex context, the relationship between government and the
nonprofit sector1 in Latin America takes on a variety of forms and has
been subject to important legislative and constitutional debates (Gidron and
Bar 2010). Perhaps the single most important measure of government–nonprofit
relations is a nation’s legal framework, as this “will influence how strong
[civil society] is in any particular setting” (Uphoff and Krishna 2004, 360;
Young 2010). A civil society legal framework is made up of “laws that attempt
to address all of the issues that arise over the “lifecycle” of a non-governmental
organization” (International Center for Nonprofit Law 2009, 4). In Latin America,
policy debates about civil society legal frameworks are occurring in a context of
democratic transition in which the parameters of the public sphere are
contested, with governments, political parties, and nonprofits seeking to carve
out territory. It is important to underline that this area of law is often contested,
with civil society advocating for a more favorable enabling environment and
the government often seeking to place restrictions on the activities and legal
status of civil society organizations, which it often perceives as a rival. Policy
toward civil society and nonprofit organizations can also be part of greater
shifts to the logics of development, for example, by producing symbolic
links to national value and belief systems (Appe 2013). The question emerges,
what conceptual lenses and explanatory factors can best illuminate these
variations?
The cases presented here highlight a mixed bag of regulatory environments.
On the one hand, countries have outdated and/or hostile legal frameworks and
lingering distrust, misunderstanding and even animosity between government
and the nonprofit sector. On the other, they feature constitutional or legal
recognition of freedom of association and the importance of an independent
sector. In this article we will draw upon the extant literature to illuminate a
complex relationship between Latin American governments and their nonprofit
sectors.
1 In this article, we generally use the terms nonprofit and civil society organization inter-
changeably to denote the nonprofit, non-governmental voluntary organizations that are usually
regarded as part of the wider civil society.
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Conceptual Framework: Government–Nonprofit
Relations
Scholars have offered various models to describe the spectrum of relationships
between government and the nonprofit sector (see Brinkerhoff 2002; Coston
1998; Najam 2000; Young 1999, 2000). Young’s (1999, 2000) typology of three
models of government–nonprofit relations in particular has been well cited. In a
supplementary relationship, the nonprofit sector fulfills the demand for public
goods left unaddressed by government, i.e., government failure. A complemen-
tary relationship is when nonprofits partner with government to deliver public
services, often with public funding; this coincides with Salamon’s (2002) notion
of a cooperative, third party government. And finally, the relationship can be
described as adversarial when nonprofits pressure government to make changes
in public policy and to push the government to be accountable to the public.
As many observe, the adversarial perspective or emphasis on conflict has
been a focus of scholarship looking at government–nonprofit relationships
(Brinkerhoff 2002; Najam 2000; Salamon 2002; Young 2000). However, conflict
theories of government relations have been challenged, suggesting that govern-
ment–nonprofit relations have actually become more cooperative and more
focused on partnerships and alliances (Salamon 1997).
A fourth type of government–nonprofit relationship missing from Young’s
typology is that of cooptation, in which a government seeks to undermine a
nonprofit’s autonomy in order to further its own political ends (Najam 2000;
Brinkerhoff 2002). While researchers note that a partnership with government
might undermine the autonomy of the sector (Salamon 2006; Smith and Lipsky
1992), when nonprofits essentially lose their autonomy and become a tool of the
state, a difference in degree becomes a difference in kind.
As suggested by this missing category, Young’s (1999, 2000) model in parti-
cular is premised on a more stable context for governance (a stronger state) and a
more harmonious relationship between the government and nonprofit sector,
more akin to Northern than Southern realities. Placing greater emphasis on
experience in the developing world, Najam (2000) states, “As they make their
way through the policy stream, the goals, interests, priorities, resources, and other
policy paraphernalia of the [nongovernmental organizations] and of governments
collide – sometimes in harmony, sometimes in discord” (p. 379). What Najam
underlines in his treatment of the topic is the essential tension that exists between
the governmental and nonprofit sectors: it is discord, rather than harmony, that is
a prevailing characteristic of the relationship in the developing world, including
Latin America. In fact, the phenomenon of government–nonprofit partnership is
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in its infancy in Latin America as its nations move away from authoritarian forms
of government and newly independent sectors find their footing.
Young (2000) applies his three lenses in a comparative manner to the history of
government–nonprofit relations in four developed countries: the United States,
Israel, Japan, and the United Kingdom. In testing the usefulness of his typology
internationally, Young addresses two questions: (1) under what circumstances does
each of the ideal types emerge? and (2) what force(s) lead to the predominance of
one relation or another? In terms of the first question, he finds that the lenses do
capture this relationship as it evolves over time and that the three relationships exist
simultaneously, with one or another gaining prominence depending on the parti-
cular historical circumstances. In terms of the second question, Young draws a
contrast between his posture and that of Najam (1999, see also 2000): while Najam
views nonprofits as “policy entrepreneurs” (1999) and claims that the relationship
reflects strategies adopted by government and nonprofits to achieve their goals,
Young (2000) seeks to emphasize “economic and social factors” (p. 150).
Young arrives at four important conclusions: these relationships are
“multilayered” and are best understood as a “composite” of the three lenses; the
relationships are dynamic and change over time; in Young’s cases the complemen-
tary relation is predominant, reflecting the fact that the sample is “representative of
modern developed countries”; and, there are important differences between the
cases and the government–nonprofit relationship “varies with the history and
traditions of a country” (pp. 168–9). Drawing upon these conclusions and the
historical case studies, he offers the following hypotheses about the dynamics of
the government–nonprofit relationship, whichwe seek to test in our cases, amending
them slightly for their relevance to the Latin American context2:
– Hypothesis 1: “The supplementary relationship becomes more prominent in
times of surging prosperity in the private economy and when government is
relatively passive in its approach to social policy or slow to respond to social
issues” (p. 169).
– Hypothesis 3: “The complementary relationship, with an emphasis on
governmental assimilation and control of nonprofit organizations, is likely
to become more prominent in times requiring national unity… the forging of
nationhood… In such periods, the supplementary and adversarial modes
may be suppressed” (p. 169).
2 We do not elaborate on Young’s second hypothesis: “The supplementary relationship
receives greater emphasis in countries that are more internally diverse and have significant
minority groups” (p. 169). We do not test this hypothesis as most Latin American countries do
not have significant minority populations, although the percentage of indigenous people and
those of African descent vary widely.
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– Hypothesis 4: “The adversarial relationship is likely to increase in promi-
nence in times of social unrest and political turmoil, when societal groups
seek governmental action and policy changes” (p. 169).
– Hypothesis 5: “The adversarial relationship, featuring governmental initia-
tives to regulate nonprofits, is likely to become prominent when private
initiatives raise governmental concerns about inordinate private influence”
(p. 169).
Here we take up his suggestion that “future research” will need to determine if
“these hypotheses confirm the experiences of other countries as well” (p. 170),
and apply them to Latin American countries undergoing political transitions,
where democracy is either not fully consolidated or even under threat. In
addition, we will offer some preliminary observations on the relative importance
of socio-economic (Young 2000) versus political factors (Najam 2000) as the
driving force behind the relationship.
Latin America: Regional Context and Case Studies
Despite important differences in each nation’s history and the development of its
nonprofit sector, it is possible to make a few general statements about
the region. One commonality is the importance of the Catholic Church in the
provision of social welfare dating from the colonial period, establishing the
pre-eminence of the supplementary relationship (Sanborn and Portocarrero
2005). During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many nations experienced
conflicts between religious and secular authorities, as evolving states sought
to claim a role in the provision of social welfare and subordinate religious
authorities and their conservative allies. Often these governments became
authoritarian, and often operated in a corporatist manner, coopting organiza-
tions and pre-empting the development of an independent nonprofit sector.
This authoritarianism began to provoke dissent in the last decades of the
twentieth century and into the twenty-first, and a more adversarial relationship
emerged. This led to the creation of organizations focused on human rights,
democratization, and increasing governmental accountability, as well as efforts
to promote socio-economic development at the grassroots level in marginalized
communities. These organizations arose in part thanks to the availability of
international support, both public and private. In general, the region’s nonprofit
sectors are relatively under-developed and receive limited financial support from
government (Salamon et al. 2004).
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The cases selected offer important variation in terms of their recent
economic and political development. Colombia and Mexico have taken the
path of economic and political liberalization and have achieved the status of
middle-income nations, although both have issues with human rights due to
their “drug wars.” The countries’ new economic status has led to the dwindling
of international support. In the poorer nations of Ecuador and Nicaragua,
foreign funders play an important – if politically controversial – role in funding
the nonprofit sector. Mexico and Colombia can be considered relatively stable or
consolidated democracies, while Ecuador and Nicaragua are described as exam-
ples of soft or competitive authoritarianism and are members of the Bolivarian
Alliance of the Americas (ALBA)3 (Weyland 2013). A key observation is that
although two (Colombia and Mexico) are more rightist and two more leftist
(Ecuador and Nicaragua), each government has sought to limit or repress civil
society in one form or another. However, as will be outlined, each of the four
cases selected offers its own trajectory in terms of the development of the
relationship between the sectors, and illustrates – to varying extents – the
models of this relation.
Colombia
Colombia’s nonprofit sector has been heavily influenced by the strong histor-
ical presence of the Catholic Church, which was the primary deliverer of
social services (Villar 1998). During the period of nation-building in the
nineteenth century, Colombia experienced an intense debate over the separa-
tion of Church and state (Villar 1998). Political conflict ensued between
Liberals and Conservatives and led to major political violence in the late
1940s into the 1950s, which constrained civil society participation and orga-
nizing (Murillo 2004). Violence among armed groups was rooted in the
struggle for land and reform and first initiated by Conservatives who under-
took what has been called a “brutal repression against the Liberal bases…”
(Murillo 2004, 46). In 1958 the National Front emerged as a coalition govern-
ment and ended the violence, but the government lost legitimacy and
the transition gave birth to new types of violence, in particular guerilla
3 ALBA has been framed around three ideas: an alternative to the Free Trade Act of the
Americas, a focus on poverty reduction through public social programs, and anti-American
rhetoric (Ponce, 2010).
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movements forming in the 1960s. These guerilla movements still plague the
country (Murillo 2004; Villar 1998). In addition, in the 1960s, the government
proved to be limited in its ability to provide for citizens, resulting in a surge
of self-help initiatives by civil society. This dynamic led to a “paradigm of
conflict” (Villar 1998, 8) or adversarial relations between the state and civil
society as it produced inter-sectoral resentment.
There is no centralized institutional framework that covers all nonprofit orga-
nizations in Colombia. However, initiatives that were implemented in the 1980s and
early 1990s launched the nonprofit sector into public space and sought to develop
more complementary relations between government and the nonprofit sector. Villar
(1998) explains that “the establishment of participatory democracy, the deepening
of decentralization, and the greater importance of the private sector in social service
provision have all contributed to the greater visibility of the nonprofit sector” (p. 2).
In addition, the Colombian Confederation of Nongovernmental Organizations
(CCONG) was created in the late 1980s and has led the sector through several
policy initiatives by engaging in dialogue with government and influencing govern-
ment decisions in social policy.
Civil society participation was purposively woven into Colombia’s
Constitution of 1991, which obligates the government to foster the sector, respect
its autonomy, and set aside public funding for nonprofit organizations to
participate in achieving the objectives of the national development plans
(Villar 1998). In addition, the government sought to develop the sector through
registration procedures. Since 1995 (Decree No. 2150) chambers of commerce
across cities and communities are charged with maintenance of organizational
information and making it available to the public (CCONG 2004).
More recently, Colombia has had a conservative right of center administra-
tion under President Alvaro Uribe (2002–2010) that focused its energies on
fighting Colombia’s armed guerrilla movements. Uribe became very popular,
particularly among middle- and high-income Colombians, and his popularity
led to a constitutional amendment that permitted him a second term. However,
adversarial relations developed with civil society, particularly with human rights
organizations, as Uribe publicly discredited the nonprofit sector (Bouvier 2004;
Ruiz-Restrepo 2005).
In 2010 Juan Manuel Santos – who served as Minister of Defense in the Uribe
Administration – was elected president. The adversarial environment between
the national government and nonprofit organizations has calmed under Santos,
and a national conversation has begun about “constructive and effective public
policy” for nonprofit organizations (National NGO Meeting 2011). Policy affecting
Colombian nonprofits under Santos’ administration has included Decree No. 019
in 2012, which introduced a new registration process, the Registry of Enterprise
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and Social (RUES). It is intended to be an efficient way to give the state and the
public a tool with reliable information on business, contractors, cooperatives,
and nonprofit organizations (http://www.rues.org.co). With this Decree, the
organizations are to register and pay a fee annually. While it is not called a
tax, CCONG representatives and the nonprofit sector at large are concerned that
it is a tax-like burden for nonprofit organizations, as it requires an annual fee of
$300 to $800 USD.
Another policy shift that has affected the work of nonprofit organizations
recently in Colombia is the peace negotiations between the Colombian govern-
ment and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) which began in
Santos’s first term in 2012 (Isacson 2014; Zambrano and Gómez 2013). The
current challenge for civil society in Colombia is carving its role out in
the peace process (Actalliance 2013). Several key civil society players in
Colombia (including CCONG, social organizations, and universities) have
joined together to create the National Pact for Peace that calls for the sector
to play an active role in the peace process by preparing itself for an accord and
its implementation. The position of the National Pact is that the transition to
peace will require the expertise and experience of civil society, which might
bring about more complementary relations between the government and the
nonprofit sector in Colombia.
Ecuador
In the first half of the twentieth century, Ecuadorian nonprofit organizations
were also very connected to the Catholic Church and social elites. Labor unions
emerged in the 1930s and by mid-century charitable organizations began to
transform into development nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) tackling
issues such as rural technical assistance, disabled persons, family planning,
and education (World Bank 2007). In the 1960s and 1970s, peasant mobilizations
and social movements emerged. The 1978 Constitution and elections in 1979
marked a key period in the development of civil society in Ecuador as the sector
grew, and the state weakened. Thus, a supplementary relationship emerged
during the 1980s and into the 1990s in Ecuador (Brautigam and Segarra 2007;
Cabrera and Vallejo 1997; World Bank 2007). This supplementary relationship
became adversarial in the 1990s and 2000s as “new social movements” related
to environment, gender equity, and indigenous rights emerged (World Bank
2007). In addition, mistrust of public institutions grew and civil society organi-
zations protested government corruption, dollarization, and neoliberal
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dislocations. Social movements and civil society organizations thus became key
players in the ousting of three presidents4 (Brautigam and Segarra 2007;
Heinrich 2007).
Ecuador’s 1998 Constitution was the first to explicitly give civil society a
space in the public arena through several mechanisms such as decentralization
initiatives at the local level, freedom of association and petition, and providing
institutional spaces to influence public policies (Ortiz 2013; World Bank 2007).
Ecuador’s most recent 2008 Constitution includes an alternative framework
of development called buen vivir (Villalba 2013), which recognizes civil
society organizations as a critical means of strengthening citizenship (Articles
96 and 97). There is no specific overarching law that addresses nonprofit
organizations; instead, rules have largely been enacted through executive
decrees (Estupiñán 2008).
Despite the inclusion of civil society in the Constitutional framework,
government–nonprofit sector relations have grown increasingly adversarial,
which resulted in key shifts in the regulatory environment that suggest efforts
at cooptation on the part of the government. In 2005, Rafael Correa was elected
president, and early on he denounced the fact that there were more than 50,000
nonprofit organizations5 with legal status in Ecuador. He has asserted that
nonprofit organizations have avoided paying taxes, have meddled in political
activities, and represented international interests (Flores 2010; La Prensa Latina
2010). On March 8, 2008, the Correa Administration released the Presidential
Executive Decree No. 982 (Presidencia de la República del Ecuador 2008) that
sought to (1) establish clear definitions of and fiscal requirements for nonprofit
organizations and (2) implement a centralized, national registry of nonprofit
organizations (Presidencia de la República del Ecuador 2008; Ministry of
Coordination of Social Development 2008). In 2013, the administration released
Executive Decree No. 16, which replaced the Decree No. 982, adding several new
requirements for legal status and also requiring that international organizations
seek further permission to work in the country. Decree No. 16 creates a new
registry, which is currently under development, called Unified Information
System of Social Organizations (SUIOS). Its goal is to make the activities of
nonprofit organizations more transparent (Presidencia de la República del
Ecuador 2013).
4 Jamil Mahuad (August 10, 1998–January 21, 2000); Lucio Gutiérrez (January 15, 2003–April
20, 2005); and Alfredo Palacio (April 20, 2005–January 14, 2007).
5 According to the government, there are 60,577 organizations with legal status in Ecuador
(http://www.sociedadcivil.gob.ec/organizacioncivil/web/reports/general.html, retrieved August
12, 2014).
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Both decrees have undergone scrutiny by international human rights obser-
vers because of concerns about the threat to freedom of association and the wide
discretion of public servants in requesting information about and dissolving
organizations. Two cases in which organizations (Acción Ecológica in 2009 and
Fundación Pachamama in 2013) were shut down by the government have
received international attention. In response to these regulatory shifts and
intensifying adversarial relations with government, Ecuador has seen a growth
in civil society networking. In 2009 organizations began to debate the creation of
a coordinating body that could be a forum for debate about issues within the
sector, such as the legalization process, regulatory policy, and relations with
government in general. This growing group of organizations began issuing
publications that same year (Aportes 2009; Estévez 2011; OSC Ecuador 2011),
including reflections on accountability mechanisms and the self-regulation of
nonprofit organizations. This body has released two reports of aggregated
descriptive data on civil society, the Report of Collective Accountability 2010
and more recently its second, Report of Accountability 2011.
In 2013, the Ecuadorian Confederation of Civil Society Organizations was
formalized. Since then, the Confederation has continued to make statements to
the press about its position on public policy concerning nonprofit organizations.
Despite the current adversarial relationship, the Confederation maintains that it
wants to establish a dialogue with the government and work with the state to
formulate an overarching law for nonprofit organizations.
Mexico
From 1929 to 2000, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) governed Mexico in a
one-party corporatist manner, which was famously described as a “perfect dictator-
ship”: through a mix of coercion, cooptation, manipulation, and fraud, the PRI
maintained its grip on power without lapsing into the brutal tactics of many
authoritarian regimes. During Mexico’s prolonged democratic transition, dating
back to student unrest in 1968, the nonprofit sector and its relationship to the
state have undergone profound transformations. While largely church-based cha-
rities co-existed with the ruling party, in the closing decades of the last century a
more autonomous sector developed, focused on promoting fair elections, human
rights, and greater governmental accountability, as well as economic and social
development, all with international support (Olvera 2010a; Verduzco and Tapia
2013). Thus in recent decades the relationship between the government and the
nonprofit sector has been supplementary, cooptive, and adversarial.
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Since the election of the first opposition presidential candidate in 2000,
organized civil society has attempted to establish its place in the Mexican
political system. After a decade-long struggle by an umbrella group of coali-
tions, in 2003 the Congress passed the Federal Law to Encourage the Activities
of Civil Society Organizations (LFFAOSC) (Garcia & Ablanedo 2007).
Symbolically, the single most important element of the law was the recognition
that the activities of organizations – but not the organizations themselves – as
being of public interest: advocates for the reform were adamant in drawing this
distinction, out of concern for the ability of the state to subvert the intent of the
law and use it as another means of control of the sector (Tapia and Robles 2006,
28). Although the law requires federal ministries to provide funding and fiscal
incentives, it does not provide any sanctions for failing to do so (Tapia and
Robles 2007, 239). Nonprofits seeking federal funds must join a registry, and all
support is disclosed on a website; those seeking fiscal incentives undergo a
more rigorous review process, and their finances are also made public. This
would seem to be the foundation for a complementary relationship, but this
possibility has yet to be fully realized.
The data reveal that many obstacles remain for the realization of the law’s
intent. In terms of federal funds, annual funding ranged between 100 and 300
million USD, about one-fifth the value of private donations; nearly half of the
funds went to 3% of the organizations; and, a similar proportion went to govern-
ment-operated nongovernmental organizations (GONGOs) (Tapia and Verduzco
2013). In terms of fiscal incentives, the process for obtaining tax-exempt status
is so arduous that relatively few organizations succeed in obtaining it (Ablanedo
et al. 2007; Layton 2011). The LFFAOSC also established both a Commission of
functionaries to oversee implementation of the law and a Technical Advisory
Council of nonprofit leaders and academics to provide advice to the
Commission, but the functioning of both bodies has been undermined by a lack
of consistency, interest, and funding from government (Tapia and Verduzco 2013).
These same weaknesses have characterized spaces for citizen participation more
generally (Olvera 2010b).
Nicaragua
The relationship between Nicaragua’s nonprofit sector and its government has
undergone a series of transformations, reflecting the dramatic shifts in the
nation’s regimes. During the 40-year dictatorial rule of the Somoza family,
civil society was largely marginalized and coopted (Borchgrevink 2006, 17–18).
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In 1979 when the regime was overthrown by the leftist Sandinista National
Liberation Front (FSLN), the revolutionary government adopted a corporatist
model that created mass organizations involving hundreds of thousands of
Nicaraguans: its great success in recruitment can be explained in part by the
fact that party-affiliated organizations were the sole means of obtaining ration
cards (Borchgrevink 2006, 18–20). Thus the demarcations between state, party
and civil society were all but erased.
With the end of the Sandinista’s rule in the election of 1990, the pendulum
swung against these mass organizations. Conservative governments eliminated
their state support and their privileged position. The 1990s witnessed a decline
in grass-roots organizations, cooperatives, and union membership, which
“was accompanied by an explosion of modern [nongovernmental organiza-
tions],” i.e., highly professionalized organizations supported by foreign funders
(Chahim and Prakash 2014, 493).
An important moment in the evolution of the relationship between the
government and the nonprofit sector occurred when Hurricane Mitch devastated
Nicaragua in 1998. During reconstruction the government sought to bypass
nonprofits and attempted to tax international donations, prompting NGOs to
form an umbrella organization, the Civil Coordinator for Emergency
Reconstruction, or CC. The CC lobbied both international actors and the govern-
ment for a better coordinated approach to the recovery and became the
“key opposition voice of the country” (Bradshaw and Linneker 2003, 154).
With 600 member organizations, no other group “has nearly the same level of
national prominence” (Chahim and Prakash 2014, 500).
In 1992 Nicaragua adopted Law No. 147: General Law of Non-profit Legal
Entities. Subsequently, nonprofits working via networks had two important
manners of influencing public policy: first, many undertook legislative lobbying
in a wide range of issues; second, as a result of their lobbying success, numer-
ous consultative bodies were established at all levels of government
(Borchgrevink 2006, 52–55). These advances took place in the context of the
weak institutionalization of the Nicaraguan state, which at once created oppor-
tunities for nonprofit organizations to intervene but failed to assure that those
opportunities would last.
With the return of the FSLN to power in 2007, the pendulum has swung
back again. The current administration has used the ambiguities in nonprofit
legal framework to harass organizations it views as opposing the regime, and it
has created extra-legal channels of participation for pro-FSLN organizations via
Citizens’ Power Councils and Citizens’ Power Cabinets, which are recognized “as
the sole representatives of Nicaragua’s civil society” (ICNL 2014).
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In Nicaragua cooptation and adversarialism have been the most prominent
models. One important theme is a concern over “NGOization,” by which
organizations have become highly professionalized and largely dependent on
international funding. The dependence on foreign funding can undermine the
legitimacy of organizations, as the grassroots perceive them as out of touch,
while their political opponents attack them for being foreign agents (Chahim
and Prakash 2014; Borchgrevink 2006).
Discussion
These case studies demonstrate both the utility and the limitations of the
conceptual lenses for understanding government–nonprofit relations proposed
by Young (1999, 2000) and Najam (2000). We find that the cases largely confirm
the hypotheses put forth by Young (2000) and stated earlier in this paper:
– Hypothesis 1: “The supplementary relationship becomes more prominent in
times of surging prosperity in the private economy and when government
is relatively passive in its approach to social policy or slow to respond to
social issues” (p. 169). In the cases presented here, surging prosperity was
not a necessary condition for the supplementary condition to arise, while
governmental passivity was a factor. The dominance of the supplementary
relationship was a function of conservative governments who either had
little interest in social policy and/or simply deferred to the traditional role
of the Catholic Church in providing poor relief. Historically, traditional
religious charities have acted in supplementary manner, offering social
services well before the advent of the welfare state and largely continuing
to do so today.
– Hypothesis 3: “The complementary relationship, with an emphasis on
governmental assimilation and control of nonprofit organizations, is likely
to become more prominent in times requiring national unity… the forging of
nationhood… In such periods, the supplementary and adversarial modes
may be suppressed” (p. 169). We find that the complementary relation can
become closer to Najam’s cooptation type in times of revolution and state-
building, when the state perceives itself as threatened. Once the welfare
state arose, and often in conjunction with authoritarian governments,
nonprofits fell into either adversarial relationships or cooptation, with
governments largely precluding the development of an independent sector.
Both Colombia (with the growing importance of the sector in the peace
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process) and Mexico (with a legal mandate to provide federal funding),
complementarity is increasing.
– Hypothesis 4: “The adversarial relationship is likely to increase in promi-
nence in times of social unrest and political turmoil, when societal groups
seek governmental action and policy changes” (p. 169). In the cases pre-
sented here, the adversarial relationship originated from the nonprofit sector
not only seeking policy change but also pushing toward democratization.
Whereas in Young’s formulation the adversarial relationship is characterized
by policy debates, in Latin America this struggle is pushed to greater
extremes and can be life-or-death for organizations.
– Hypothesis 5: “The adversarial relationship, featuring governmental initia-
tives to regulate nonprofits, is likely to become prominent when private
initiatives raise governmental concerns about inordinate private influence”
(p. 169). Indeed, we see this in the Latin American region and find that the
adversarial relationship originated from government, particularly when the
nonprofit sector is being supported by foreign actors, be they private or
public. (This was the case in pre-2000 Mexico and in present-day Nicaragua
and Ecuador.) Historically, cooptation has been an important way for
authoritarian governments to preclude the emergence of an autonomous
sector and potentially threatening rivals.
Clearly, Young’s (1999, 2000) three “lenses” provide a very useful means of
understanding this complex and evolving relationship in Latin America.
However, the present cases support Najam’s (1999, 2000) position on two
important points. First, it is useful to distinguish between complementarity
and cooptation, especially in the context of authoritarian governments.
Second, while socio-economic factors clearly influence the evolution of the
government–nonprofit relationship, the role of policy entrepreneurs on both
sides of the relationship has been preeminent in Latin America, and perhaps
more generally in countries with weaker economies and which are undergoing
democratic transition. In the last decade, many of these governments have
recognized in their constitutions or in their laws the important role that
associations (should) play in a democracy. This has largely been due to intense
advocacy on the part of nonprofit policy entrepreneurs, including sectoral
networks, which react to an impulse to control the growth and activities of
the sector on the part of elected officials. However, until governments over-
come the impulse to coopt or suppress the nonprofit sector, it will be difficult
for the nonprofit sector to realize its potential. In addition, we have found that
the two members of the ALBA coalition, Ecuador and Nicaragua, have been
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more aggressive in placing limitations on their nonprofit sectors, while the
two more liberal nations, Colombia and Mexico, have generally shown greater
restraint.
Conclusion
The conceptual lenses provided by Young (2000), as amended by Najam (2000),
provide a useful way of systematizing the dynamics of the government–
nonprofit relationship in the Latin American cases studied. Figure 1, adapted
from Young 2000, offers a visual representation of the mix of relationships
described in the case studies. While Young’s four cases clustered near the top
of the triangle near complementarity, here the tendency is for the nations to be
closer to the bottom, between supplementary and adversarial. It is important to
point out that Colombia and to a lesser degree Mexico have moved toward
greater complementarity, both Ecuador’s and Nicaragua’s relationship is much
closer to adversarial.
In Latin America the potential of realizing a mutually beneficial government–
nonprofit relationship is hampered by the absence of key institutional condi-
tions which deserve continued attention in the literature: outdated legal frame-
works; governmental distrust toward and ignorance of the sector; inter-sectoral
jealousy, with governments being reluctant to build up the capacity of the sector
and nonprofits distrusting the government; and, weakly institutionalized states.
Figure 1: Nonprofit–government relations in Latin America.
Source: Young (2000).
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In addition, for some academics and activists, it is essential that the nonprofit
sector – more often termed civil society – not fall into a neo-liberal trap of acting
as counterparts to the state, but retain their “critical relationship” character
(Olvera 2003, 430).
As government–nonprofit relationships continue to evolve in the region,
it is critical that advocates – while working for a more favorable legal
framework – also seek to create a more favorable enabling environment for
the sector, including: a stronger civic culture, financial resources, account-
ability mechanisms, and capacity building (Layton 2009). Indeed, through
the four cases of Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Nicaragua, we see that civil
society has emerged in Latin America in the recent decades as a critical force
for democratization and the promotion of human rights, expanding well
beyond its traditionally limited role in providing charitable relief to the
poor. Building an enabling environment is critical to fulfill the expanding
and important role of civil society, and nonprofit organizations in particular,
in the region.
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